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Coastal Land Loss and the Mitigation–Adaptation
Dilemma: Between Scylla and Charybdis
Blake Hudson∗
ABSTRACT
Coastal land loss is an inevitable consequence of the confluence
of three primary factors: population growth, vanishing wetlands,
and rising sea levels. Society may either mitigate coastal land loss
by engaging in human engineering projects that create
technological solutions or restore natural processes that protect the
coastal zone, or it may choose to adapt to coastal land loss by
shifting development and other human and economic resources out
of areas especially at risk for coastal land loss. This Article first
details the primary threats to coastal lands. Next, the Article
discusses two primary means of addressing coastal land loss—
mitigation and adaptation—applying those terms slightly differently
than they are used in the broader climate change context in order to
focus more precisely on the coastal land loss phenomena and its
solutions. Finally, the Article makes three normative claims for why
policy-makers should approach coastal land loss mitigation in
particular with caution: (1) uncertainty of mitigation’s effectiveness
scientifically and institutionally; (2) the political expediency of
choosing mitigation over adaptation; and (3) the fact that failure to
adapt past land-use activities in the coastal zone has contributed to
the need to adapt or mitigate today.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ANCIENT MYTH AND THE MODERN REALITY
He runs on Scylla, wishing to avoid Charybdis.1
Erasmus, Adagia
In Homer’s epic Odyssey, the hero Odysseus faces a tragic
choice. He must guide his men through a narrow strait and either
pass close to Charybdis, a sea monster that spewed forth water
three times per day with disastrous consequence, or pass close to
Scylla, a monster on the coast with six snake-like heads filled with
fangs and encircled with the heads of baying dogs around its
1. The idiom “between Scylla and Charybdis” means “between two
equally perilous alternatives, neither of which can be passed without
encountering and probably falling victim to the other.” Scylla Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/scylla (last visited
Aug. 31, 2012).
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waist.2 Odysseus ultimately chose the latter fate, accepting the loss
of some of his men by crashing into the coast, but calculating that
he would lose far fewer men than if he challenged the raging sea.
U.S. citizens and policy-makers face a similarly costly
choice―that of either grappling directly with increasingly
menacing and encroaching seas or undergoing the societally and
economically disruptive, but potentially less devastating, transition
to further inland. As the climate continues to change and sea levels
continue to rise, the United States will continue to lose coastal land
due to these “geologic” forces. At the same time, American
citizens continue to flock to the coastal zone at a rate tracking the
already high exponential rate of population growth.3 Along with
that growth comes increased residential, commercial, and
industrial coastal-zone development and associated infrastructure
improvements, resulting in what may be described as “artificial”
coastal land loss, or “runaway land consumption,”4 as land
continues to be appropriated from its natural state by human
activity. Though land development has certainly contributed to
societal, economic, and technological advancement, when land
development becomes wasteful of valuable ecosystem service and
other functions provided by natural habitat, then those attributes of
the land are lost and society is faced with great difficulty (if not
impossibility) in recreating them. Consider the leveeing and
diversion of the Mississippi River or the filling in of coastal
wetlands. As these natural lands became increasingly developed
and subject to human-made engineering projects, their functional
provision of buffer from sea-level rise, protection from hurricane
storm surge and provision of other forms of flood control, water
filtration services, and habitat protection may certainly be
considered a form of land loss.
In later times, Scylla was rationalized as a rocky shoal, an
inescapable threat upon which those seeking to avoid Charybdis
would inevitably crash. Indeed, due to population and development
pressures, the U.S. coastline is becoming increasingly hardened
2. Scylla and Charybdis, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/530331/Scylla-and-Charybdis (last visited Aug.
31, 2012).
3. KRISTEN M. CROSSETT ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., POPULATION TRENDS ALONG THE COASTAL UNITED STATES: 1980–
2008 1 (2004), available at http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/programs/mb/pdfs/
coastal_pop_trends_complete.pdf.
4. DANA BEACH, PEW OCEANS COMM’N, COASTAL SPRAWL: THE EFFECTS
OF URBAN DESIGN ON AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES ii (2002),
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
Protecting_ocean_life/env_pew_oceans_sprawl.pdf.
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like the precipice of Scylla―whether it is the filling of coastal
wetlands to provide a foundation for agricultural, industrial, or
residential development; the very concrete structures and paved
surfaces that comprise coastal development; or the sea walls, dams,
levees, and other man-made artifices designed to keep the sea at
bay. This hardening of the coast exacerbates coastal threats to
human populations, potentially forcing them to make a painful
choice to run even farther inland to higher ground. Similarly,
Charybdis was later rationalized as a giant, destructive whirlpool―
a reconceptualization bearing an almost prophetic semblance to the
rising seas that now threaten U.S. coasts.
It is time for the myth of Scylla and Charybdis to be
reconceptualized once more and in line with the potentially tragic
modern reality, especially given its accurate metaphor of choosing
between the perils of the sea and the threats looming on the coast.
The modern choice regards how we allocate priority on either
mitigation or adaptation as the primary response to coastal land
lossassuming, of course, that we do not wish to take the third
option of doing nothing and allowing our ship to sink. With coastal
land loss mitigation we have a choice to confront Charybdis in an
attempt to keep the sea at bay: to design policies and invest billions
of dollars to restore wetlands; to rebuild coastal lands and barrier
islands through dredging and other large-scale engineering
projects; or to create man-made structures such as sea walls and
other mechanisms of tide and flood control, to name a few
examples. With coastal land loss adaptation we have a choice to
“run on Scylla” and endure the hardship of, first, slowing the rapid
commercial and industrial land development and population boom
in high risk areas of our coastal zone, and second, making a
difficult transition from already existing development and
infrastructure in these areas to higher ground inland.
Certainly these two options are not mutually exclusive, and as
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has noted, policies
aimed at both are necessary to manage climate change generally,
and coastal land loss specifically.5 Yet, the relative emphasis on
either mitigation or adaptation (as a general matter and given the
unique needs of particular geographic regions) will have drastic
ramifications not only for the effectiveness of the coastal land loss
response, but also for the amount and allocation of local, state, and
federal financial resources. In other words, though both mitigation
5. RICHARD J.T. KLEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND VULNERABILITY
745 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter18.pdf.
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and adaptation are likely to be used in different areas along the
coast, a great risk lies in striking the balance between the two that
places too much emphasis on one or the other. In particular, though
coastal land loss mitigation may be the more appealing option in
the short term, since society may be reticent to accept major
changes to historical land use and settlement patterns in the coastal
zone and may have a tendency to believe it can engineer its way
out of any environmental crisis, mitigation efforts also pose the
greatest risk if they fail. Though coastal land loss adaptation may
be more difficult over the short term, it will succeed in moving
society out of harm’s way regardless of whether projected climate
change-related threats to the coastal zone come to fruition to the
degree projected. On the other hand, the change that will take place
in the coastal zone due to climate change may be too great to
effectively combat with attempted engineering projects or wetland
restoration efforts aimed at keeping the sea at bay, potentially
resulting in years of wasted effort and billions of dollars that would
have been better utilized to shift societal infrastructure away from
high-risk areas.
This Article in no way seeks to provide definitive solutions for
striking the balance between coastal land loss adaptation and
mitigation, either regarding how precisely the balance should be
struck or where along different coastal regions coastal land loss
adaptation would be preferable to mitigation and vice versa.
Various regions of the U.S. and around the world face different
coastal land loss challenges, depending on whether they are
designated as a delta region, a rocky coast, or some other form of
geologic intersection of land and sea. Given the complexities of
choosing and designing coastal land loss mitigation or adaptation
policies by region, this Article merely seeks to highlight some
considerations for policy-makers and scientists when making those
choices and designing coastal land loss policies. The Article does
so by first, in Part II, describing the confluence of events that have
given rise to coastal land loss, namely population growth,
vanishing wetlands, and sea-level rise. Part III then discusses the
mitigation and adaptation response options for coastal land loss,
neither of which are optimal, but which are the most viable
responses to inevitable climate change impacts. Part IV then makes
a normative claim that we should approach coastal land loss
mitigation with caution and, like Odysseus, have the courage to
retreat from the rising tide by choosing adaptation when the longterm view would demand it in areas particularly vulnerable to
coastal land loss. This normative claim of caution toward coastal
land loss mitigation actions is based primarily on three
considerations: (1) the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of
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mitigation actions over the long term; (2) the tempting political
expediency that may misguidedly drive policy-makers’ choice to
implement mitigation policies over adaptation; and (3) the fact that
failure to adapt past land-use activities in the coastal zone has
contributed to the need to adapt or mitigate today—lending support
to the premise that adaptation now can avoid both costly mitigation
policies as well as preempt the need to mitigate or adapt to coastal
land loss in the future.
II. THE PERFECT STORM FOR COASTAL LAND LOSS: POPULATION
GROWTH, VANISHING WETLANDS, AND RISING SEAS
Three primary phenomena have converged in the coastal zone
to give rise to coastal land loss. These phenomena are so
inextricably entwined that discussing them in isolation is difficult.
Populations have increased in the coastal zone, exacerbating
“artificial” land loss as commercial, industrial, and residential
development replace coastal lands, coastal natural capital (such as
wetlands), and the ecosystem services that those resources provide.
In turn, rising populations have increased the need to protect
human-made capital in the coastal zone, which has given rise to
more dams, levees, sea walls and other structures that have starved
the coast of sediment, replaced wetlands, and caused subsidence
that accelerates sea-level rise—compounding “geologic” coastal
land loss by further accelerating an already increasing rate of sealevel rise. The following sections briefly discuss these phenomena
in turn.
A. Population Growth
The Low Elevation Coastal Zone (LECZ) is the contiguous
area along the coast that is less than ten meters above sea level.
Though this area covers only 2% of the world’s land area, it
contains 10% of the world’s population and 13% of global urban
population.6 As a result of high populations in the coastal zone,
“[b]oth urban disasters and environmental hot spots are already
located disproportionately in low-lying coastal areas. Climate
change will increase the risk of both.”7
6. Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of
Climate Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19
ENV’T & URBANIZATION 17, 17 (2007), available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.
edu/gpw/docs/McGranahan2007.pdf.
7. Id. at 18 (citation omitted) (stating further that “[i]n particular, rising sea
levels will increase the risk of ﬂoods, and stronger tropical storms may further
increase the ﬂood risk”).
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In 2003, approximately 153 million U.S. citizens, or 53% of
the population, lived in coastal counties. Ten of the fifteen largest
U.S. cities are in coastal counties,8 and “23 of the 25 most densely
populated U.S. counties are coastal.”9 Coastal counties, as a
general matter, average 300 persons per square mile—far more
than the national average of 98 persons per square mile.10 As a
result, over half of the U.S. population lives within the 17% of land
that is coastal,11 with some states maintaining over half of their
population in the coastal zone. Louisiana, for example, is one of
two states bordering the Gulf of Mexico with a majority of its
population in coastal counties (or, more precisely, “parishes” in
Louisiana).12
Not only are absolute population numbers in the coastal zone
disproportionate to total U.S. population, but so too is the rate of
population growth. Coastal population increased between 1980 and
2003 by 33 million,13 accounting for nearly half of the United
States’ total population growth during that time period.14 Stated
differently, nearly half of the total U.S. population’s growth
occurred within 17% of its land, the coastal zone. Coastal
population is expected to increase by another 27 million by 2017,
accounting this time for more than half of the country’s total
population increase.15 The rate of population growth in coastal
counties outpacing that of the country as a whole creates a
dramatic increase in population density along the coast, which,
combined with the fast-growing coastal economy,16 increases the
rate at which coastal land is lost due to human activities (i.e.,
“artificial” coastal land loss).17
Permanent settlement, however, is not the only population
pressure along the coast. The yearly influx of vacationers increases
coastal stress even further, and “[w]ith more people comes the
need for increased infrastructure,” which leads to even more
8. CROSSETT ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id. Coastal counties also provide a key source of waterborne commerce,
with seven of the ten leading ports in Gulf states and south Louisiana accounting
for about 9% of waterborne commerce in principal U.S. ports. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 18 (noting that the other state is Florida).
13. Id. at 1.
14. See Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.
gov/popest/data/historical/index.html (last updated May 22, 2012).
15. BEACH, supra note 4, at ii.
16. The median household income of coastal counties is approximately 17%
higher than noncoastal counties. CROSSETT ET AL., supra note 3, at 12.
17. Id. at 1.
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coastal land loss.18 Furthermore, “[i]n the next few decades, coastal
areas will also see a growing proportion of older Americans and an
unprecedented number of Americans reaching retirement age.”19
Each of these factors contributes to a population boom along the
coast.
Along with increased population comes a great deal of
economic wealth and resources. In 2000, coastal counties
contained 57% of civilian income, and income per square
kilometer in these counties is more than eight times that of inland
counties.20 Furthermore, the level and growth rate of per capita
income is strongly positively correlated with coastal proximity.21
In 2000, coastal counties maintained per worker annual labor
income that averaged approximately $41,000 versus approximately
$31,000 in inland counties.22 In addition, coastal counties maintain
citizenry that are, on average, more educated than inland counties.
Nearly 28% of adults in coastal counties in 2000 had at least a
Bachelor’s degree, compared to 22% of inland adults, while nearly
11% had a graduate degree, compared to 8% of inland adults.23
As if exponential population growth in and of itself did not
stress coastal lands enough, the population growth rate and the
accumulation of wealth in the coastal zone each reinforce a
feedback loop whereby development pressures increase at rates
that actually outpace population growth generally. For example,
while a great degree of natural capital has been replaced by
agricultural lands in the coastal zone, coastal counties in the United
States are losing nearly 2,000 acres of farmland per day to
urbanization and other development,24 and “[s]ome large coastal
metropolitan areas are consuming land ten times as fast as they are
adding new residents.”25 In 1997, the amount of developed coastal
acreage was 14%, but if current rates of land consumption continue
unchecked, more than one-quarter of coastal acreage will be
developed by 2025.26 In fact, “[b]y most measures, human impacts
to coastal ecosystems have grown faster than the rate of population
growth. So, although population statistics paint an alarming picture
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Jordan Rappaport & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The United States as a Coastal
Nation, 8 J. ECON. GROWTH 5, 5 (2003), available at http://mvs.ei.columbia.edu/
sitefiles/file/about/director/documents/jeg0304.pdf.
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id.
24. CROSSETT ET AL., supra note 3, at 16.
25. BEACH, supra note 4, at ii.
26. Id.
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for coastal management, they actually understate the magnitude of
the challenge.”27 Developed land in the United States as a whole
increased by 25 million acres (34%) between 1982 and 1997,
which “means that more than one-fourth of all of the land
converted from rural to urban and suburban uses since European
settlement occurred in only 15 years.”28 Though developed land
grew by 34%, corresponding population growth was only 15%,
demonstrating that land consumption occurred at a rate “more than
twice the underlying rate of population growth [, and] the
mismatch between land development and population growth is
widening. Between 1982 and 1992, land was developed at 1.8
times the rate of population growth. During the period between
1992 and 1997, that multiple had grown to 2.5.”29 One can imagine
the result of stacking exponential land consumption on top of
exponential population growthcoastal land that is being
appropriated and “lost” at astonishing rates. As described by the
Pew Oceans Commission:
Between 2000 and 2025, the U.S. population is projected to
grow by 22 percent. If the relationship between land use
and population in the last decade continues, there will be 68
million more acres of developed land in the contiguous
U.S. than there are today . . . . This newly developed
acreage—equivalent to the land area of Wyoming—will
almost match the amount of land developed from the
founding of the country until 1983.30
In other words, “[i]f developed land were expanding at the
same rate as population, coastal zone management would be a
formidable task. With development vastly outstripping even the
relatively high rate of population growth, the challenge is
considerably greater.”31 Because more than half of this projected
growth will occur within the coastal zone, the impact will be even
greater along the coast. In 1982, 10% of coastal watersheds were
developed, which increased to nearly 14% in 1997, and if trends
continue, more than 25% of the country’s coastal watersheds will
be developed by 2025.32
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id. This can have profound impacts on coastal ecosystem health, because:
When more than ten percent of the acreage of a watershed is covered in
roads, parking lots, rooftops, and other impervious surfaces, the rivers
and streams within the watershed become seriously degraded . . . . By
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In short, “U.S. economic activity is overwhelmingly
concentrated near its ocean and Great Lakes coasts,” and this
concentration is increasing.33 Exponential population growth,
combined with disproportionate economic growth and wealth
accumulation in the coastal zone, combined with development
impacts that increase exponentially and disproportionately with the
underlying rate of population growth, make any choice between
land loss mitigation or adaptation policies, and any attempt to
actually implement them, exceedingly difficult. The investment
needed to implement mitigation policies will continue to rise. As
more people need protection from geologic land loss caused by the
encroaching seas, there is also more wealth to protect in the form
of residential and commercial development, jobs, and
infrastructure tied directly to inland economic welfare.
Furthermore, “artificial” coastal land loss is exacerbated by
increasingly diminishing natural capital and associated ecosystem
services.
As with mitigation, adaptation policies must grapple with the
fact that there are more people to move out of coastal areas, more
wealth accumulation and investment to forestall in order to prevent
development of new areas, and increased economic and social
inertia that make slowing down coastal zone growth in the first
instance difficult, much less steering already anchored economic
and social systems further inland. The irony is that while
productivity factors have traditionally driven wealth accumulation
in the coastal zone, quality of life considerations have played an
increasing rolequality of life that will quickly degrade without
making the difficult choice to adopt adaptation or mitigation
measures.34 The rapid reduction of natural capital increasingly
recognized as crucial to human welfare, particularly the loss of
coastal wetlands, is compounding the reduction in quality of life
along the coastal zone.

virtually every measure of ecosystem health, the streams, creeks,
marshes, and rivers surrounded by hardened watersheds are less diverse,
less stable, and less productive than those in natural watersheds. If the
percentage of the coast that is developed rises sharply (from 14 percent to
25 percent) over the next 25 years, these studies point to an irreversible
decline in coastal aquatic ecosystem health.
Id. at 7.
33. Rappaport & Sachs, supra note 20, at 7.
34. Id.
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B. Vanishing Wetlands
Over the last century, development has claimed over half of all
wetlands in North America.35 The loss of important ecosystem
services provided by wetlands can “make urban settlements more
prone to disaster, amplifying the risks of climate change.”36
Wetlands provide a wide variety of ecosystem services important
to both human well-being and the maintenance of coastal land—
not only the physical maintenance of coastal land, but also the
maintenance of its functionality. Wetlands provide a variety of
services. Wetlands act as a key buffer system that protects against
storm surge caused by hurricanes and other weather events;
dissipate and absorb flood waters and stormwater runoff—thus
protecting local communities and saving municipalities flood
control expenditures; act as an anchor for preserving coastal lands
by dispersing coast-building sediment and forestalling coastal
erosion; provide water filtration services that clean coastal waters;
act as a major carbon sink that helps regulate the climate; and
provide habitat for coastal species, among a variety of other
services.
Vanishing wetlands are directly tied to rising sea levels as well
as increasing populations and associated development. As
described by scholars:
Water drains more rapidly from built-over land, increasing
peak ﬂows and ﬂood risks . . . . In many parts of the world,
developers have drained wetlands . . . removing a buffer
against tidal ﬂoods. Particularly in delta regions, land
compaction, subsidence due to groundwater withdrawal
and reductions in the rate of sediment deposition (due to
water regulation) can lead, in effect, to sea-level rise,
increasing ﬂood risk (as well as creating various other
problems).37
In some U.S. states—Louisiana, for example—the
disappearance of wetlands has indeed compounded coastal land
loss and has further synergized with rising sea levels to exacerbate
disaster events that have become seared into the collective national
35. David Moreno-Mateos et al., Structural and Functional Loss in
Restored Wetland Ecosystems, 10 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2012), available at
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.10
01247 (follow “PDF” hyperlink).
36. McGranahan et al., supra note 6, at 18. Other resources, such as coastal
forests and coral reefs, are similarly imperiled. Roughly one-third of coastal
mangrove forests and one-fifth of coral reefs have disappeared. Id. at 19.
37. Id. at 19.
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consciousness—Hurricane Katrina being a recent example, causing
by some estimates $108 billion in damages.38 The loss of wetlands
has had particular implications for gulf hurricanes and resulting
severe-flood events, leading to ever-increasing economic and
human costs. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that low-lying
coastal lands, for instance, “are already vulnerable to erosion,
flooding, storm surges, and tsunamis; and poor development
planning has placed trillions of dollars’ worth of building and
infrastructure directly in the path of these threats.”39
Coastal Louisiana is a complex ecosystem created by 7,000
years of sediment deposition from the Mississippi River.40 Even
so, Louisiana is losing 6,600 acres of coastal wetlands per year.41
Some of this loss is naturally occurring, but “the real culprits are
human-made”42 and include commercial and residential
development, levees, navigational channels, and oil-and-gas
infrastructure. The overland flow of storm surge can be stifled by
healthy marshes and cypress swamps, and natural waterways
facilitate sediment and nutrient exchange. In contrast, storm surge
is uninhibited when flowing through deep man-made navigation
channels, which in turn results in the need to construct and
maintain even more man-made flood control devices.43 In addition
to inhibiting sediment and nutrient exchange with the landscape,
navigation channels further provide a pathway for salt water to
move inland and destroy inland cypress swamps and freshwater
marshes.44
Conversion of natural wetlands to pastures, agricultural lands,
and cities has resulted in the need for higher levees and larger
pumps for flood protection and has further eliminated the natural
process of soil accretion, which, when combined with sea-level
rise and increased subsidence, causes the landscape to eventually
38. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLE
REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 13 (2005), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.
gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf.
39. Christophe A.G. Tulou et al., Climate Change and the Marine
Environment, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 571, 578 (Donald C.
Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds., 2008).
40. COASTAL LA. ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION, REDUCING
FLOOD DAMAGE IN COASTAL LOUISIANA: COMMUNITIES, CULTURE &
COMMERCE 2 (2006) [hereinafter CLEAR], available at http://www.clear.lsu.
edu/pdfs/clear_newsletter_20081016112354.pdf.
41. ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 19 (2010).
42. Id.
43. CLEAR, supra note 40, at 2.
44. Id.
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sink below the water level.45 Prior to levee construction, natural
flooding from rivers and bays provided the important function of
adding sediment and organic matter through the process of
accretion, which allows land elevation to remain stable in the face
of sea-level rise and soil subsidence.46 Levees disrupt the delivery
of these sediments, and removing water from the soil increases
subsidence, reduces accretion, and requires ever increasing levee
height and pump capacity as “land continues to sink [and] the sea
level rises.”47
Ultimately, human development activities in coastal Louisiana
have “accelerate[d] coastal land loss by reducing the natural flow
of the [Mississippi] [R]iver’s freshwater and sediment to wetland
areas, where the lost land would then naturally be replenished.”48
Instead of maintaining and replenishing wetlands, the sediment
empties into the Gulf as far as the outer continental shelf where it
cannot form important barrier islands.49 As these barrier islands
erode, storm surges and wave impacts threaten commercial
infrastructure farther and farther inland, again leading to the need
to build more levees, larger levees, and more robust pumping
systems.50 So, it is not only commercial and residential coastal
development that cause disaster related to wetland loss, but also
the very human-made structures meant to prevent coastal land loss
and associated disasters in the first instance. As scholars have
described: “Unintended consequences of flood protection measures
[and] individual public work projects have increased risks to
natural resources [and] human settlements resulting in a more
dangerous place to live [and] work.”51 Indeed, had more natural
wetlands been maintained along coastal Louisiana, they could have
prevented much of Katrina’s storm surge damage. Other coastal
states face a similarly staggering amount of wetland loss. For
example, in only the last 15 years, 84,000 acres of wetlands have

45. Id. Coastal wetland forests are also at risk. Much of Louisiana’s cypress
forests, for example, are expected to be entirely wiped out over the next 20 years
if current conditions remain and projections come to fruition. COASTAL PROT. &
RESTORATION AUTH. OF LA., DRAFT JAN. 2012: LOUISIANA’S COMPREHENSIVE
MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST 159 (Jan. 12, 2012) [hereinafter
DRAFT MASTER PLAN] (unpublished draft) (on file with the Louisiana Law
Review).
46. CLEAR, supra note 40, at 2.
47. Id.
48. VERCHICK, supra note 41, at 19.
49. Id.
50. CLEAR, supra note 40, at 2.
51. Id. at 3.
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been converted to urban development in Florida—a rate of 5,600
acres per year.52
Despite the increasing rate of destruction of coastal wetlands,
state and federal governments have largely failed to formulate a
plan for curbing their destruction, restoring them, or designing
policies to encourage a shift in development activities to farther
inland. After Hurricane Georges barely missed New Orleans in
1998, a $14 billion wetlands restoration plan was formulated, but
Congress and the Bush administration did not act on the
proposal.53 Following another near miss from Hurricane Ivan, one
Louisiana administrator observed, “What is it going to take for
Congress and the president to realize this is not just another
project? . . . Would we have had to get hit by the big one? Who
wants to wait for that? Surely it shouldn’t have to take loss of life,
[should] it?”54 Only one year later, Hurricane Katrina killed at least
1,800 people and cost over $108 billion in damages.55 As discussed
below, it is unclear whether wetlands restoration is a surefire, longterm answer to addressing coastal land loss, and it seems clear that
a history of poor development planning contributed to Katrina’s
human and economic costs. Even so, some might argue that the
$14 billion wetlands restoration cost is a bargain compared to the
$108 billion in damages wrought by Katrina. The economic costs
of not curbing destruction of existing wetlands, guiding current and
future development away from rapidly eroding coastal lands and
rising sea levels, or restoring wetlands will only increase, since
hurricanes are expected to become both more frequent and more
intense as climate change contributes to warmer oceans.56
Ultimately, vanishing wetlands synergize with rising populations
and rising sea levels to compound coastal land loss.
C. Rising Seas
Rising sea level is perhaps the most obvious threat to coastal
lands—it is the Charybdis from which we must either flee by
adapting or fight by mitigating to the extent possible. Indeed, as
Odysseus perceived regarding the dangers of Charybdis, scholars
52. Matthew Waite & Craig Pittman, Katrina Offers Lesson on Wetlands
Protection, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.sptimes.com/2005/09/
05/Worldandnation/Katrina_offers_lesson.shtml.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. KNABB ET AL., supra note 38, at 12–13.
56. Tulou et al., supra note 39, at 578. More frequent and intense category
four and five storms have occurred over the past 30 years, a trend “directly
linked to increases in sea-surface temperatures.” Id.
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have argued that climate change, the source of more rapid sea-level
rise in the recent past and in the future, is nothing more than “a
slow-moving disaster.”57 Unlike most disasters, however, the
harmful land loss threats of sea-level rise are not immediately
obvious, because its observable impacts play out incrementally
over human lifetimes. This makes sea-level rise arguably even
more dangerous than other threats to coastal lands, at least in the
sense of spurring human action. The full magnitude of harm is
apparent only when temporally aggregated over periods of time
exceeding any one generation’s lifespan. Thus, forging collective
action among individuals, policy-makers, and governments to
avoid the disaster is especially difficult. As Professor Buzbee
described: “A sudden disaster or perceived crisis is often essential
to rouse the populace and give politicians reasons to take on issues
of harms caused by industry and the process of real estate
development.”58 While sea-level rise may exacerbate sudden
disaster events like floods, it is otherwise by definition not
“sudden,” thus masking the perceived crisis.
Though sea level rose .17 meters over the past century, a rate of
roughly 1.7 mm/year,59 satellite imagery demonstrates that the rate
increased to 3.1 mm/year between 1993 and 2003.60 In other words,
the rate of sea-level rise is accelerating. Because this increased rate
corresponds with increases in atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases and temperatures over the same time period, the
future impact of a changing climate on sea levels is highly variable
and uncertain. A recent report found that “[p]rojections of sea-level
rise for the twenty-first century vary widely, ranging from several
centimeters to more than a meter.”61 Even so, these estimates may
be revised upward given the continued rise in global temperatures
and the rapid loss of arctic and Antarctic ice sheets.62 Ultimately,
“warming and sea level rise will continue for more than a
millennium, even if carbon dioxide concentrations are stabilized,
due to the long time required to remove this gas from the
atmosphere.”63 This dire warning has critical implications for
coastal land loss, because “rising sea levels . . . will ensure increased
57. JOSH EAGLE, COASTAL LAW 33 (2011).
58. William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of
Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 129–30 (1999).
59. Tulou et al., supra note 39, at 575.
60. Id.
61. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEALEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MID-ATLANTIC REGION IX (2009), available at http://
www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-1/final-report/sap4-1-final-report-all.pdf.
62. Tulou et al., supra note 39, at 575.
63. Id. at 576.

46

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

damage along increasingly developed shorelines”64 as rising seas
“inundate low areas and increase flooding, coastal erosion, wetland
loss, and saltwater intrusion into estuaries and freshwater
aquifers.”65 Furthermore, rising “sea levels interact with tides and
storms to create more destructive impacts, as extreme high water
levels occur with more frequency.”66
Approximately 58,000 square kilometers of coastline along the
Atlantic seaboard and Gulf of Mexico are less than 1.5 meters
above sea level, with more than 80% of this coastline in Louisiana,
Florida, Texas, and North Carolina. North Carolina alone
maintains as much land within one meter of sea level as the
Netherlands.67 Indeed, “Atlantic and Gulf Coast shorelines are
especially vulnerable to long term sea-level rise . . . . [T]he slope
of these areas is so gentle that a small rise in sea level produces a
large inland shift of the shoreline.”68 Approximately 1,600 square
kilometers of land in 85 eastern seaboard counties lie less than a
meter above current sea levels, potentially threatening
approximately 4,800 kilometers of roads and 388,000 people.69
Over the next 50 years, coastal erosion is estimated to threaten
nearly 87,000 homes along U.S. coasts.70
In the City of Boston, sea levels could rise up to a meter over
the next 100 years, and even best-case estimates of sea-level rise
and climate change could leave “Massachusetts General Hospital,
the Public Garden, the Esplanade, and MIT in a pool of water after
a strong storm surge in the harbor.”71 Flood damage in Boston
would be around $57 billion over the next 100 years, $26 billion
more than would occur without sea-level rise impacts.72 On the
other side of the country in California, a mere .3 meter rise in sea
level would cause what were once 100-year storm surge flood
events to become ten-year events.73 Similarly, in San Diego, a nosea-level-rise scenario would result in approximately ten extreme
weather events between 2070–2100, but “[o]ver the same time
period there would be approximately 330 extreme events with a
64. Id. at 578.
65. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, supra note 61, at IX.
66. Tulou et al., supra note 39, at 578.
67. Id.
68. EAGLE, supra note 57, at 27.
69. Id.
70. Tulou et al., supra note 39, at 578–79.
71. Susan Milligan, Study Predicts City Flood Threat Due to Warming,
BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/
local/articles/2005/02/15/study_predicts_city_flood_threat_due_to_warming/.
72. Id.
73. Tulou et al., supra note 39, at 578.
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rise in sea level of twenty centimeters, 2,300 extreme events with a
rise of forty centimeters, and almost 19,000 events with a rise of
eighty centimeters.”74
These brief examples merely demonstrate that mitigation and
adaptation policies aimed at coastal land loss and associated
disasters must inevitably grapple with the consequences of sealevel rise because:
Sea levels rising at exponential rates (over geologic time
scales) will meet head-on with a rush of humans heading at
exponential rates right into the face of the disaster—an
ironic scenario that demonstrates the circular nature of
human psychology related to disasters. Humans exacerbate
climate change through carbon emissions, and as a result
sea levels rise; then humans move in disproportionate
numbers into areas likely to be inundated by rising sea
levels; then society expects a system of disaster law and
policy to alleviate their difficulties after disaster strikes.75
Despite the negative land-use policy impacts caused by this
type of collective psychological inertia, governments are beginning
the process of preparing for rising seas. The Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority of Louisiana (CPRA), for example, issued a
recent report finding that “Louisiana is particularly sensitive to
sea-level rise due to the unique geology of the State’s Delta and
Chenier Plains” and that the State must “integrate up-to-date sealevel rise data into planning and engineering activities to anticipate
coastal land loss patterns, protect coastal communities and
adequately design restoration projects.”76 Rising sea levels in
74. Id.
75. See Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address
Transitory and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1991, 2010–11 (2011) (emphasis added). Governments, of
course, share the blame for this psychological predisposition. As Professor
Barnhizer has noted in the context of floodplain development:
[Governments] continue to expend hundreds of millions of dollars
annually to repair repeated and foreseeable damage to unwise and
unsustainable private development and public infrastructure and
facilities. Instead of limiting flood-plain development, those policies
and practices continue to maintain development against rising sea
levels, climate change, extreme weather phenomena, and erosion.
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private
Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 296 (2003).
76. KRISTIN DEMARCO ET AL., COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. OF
LA., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ANTICIPATING SEA-LEVEL RISE IMPACTS ON
LOUISIANA COASTAL RESOURCES DURING PROJECT PLANNING AND DESIGN:
SUMMARY OF THE TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COASTAL MANAGERS 1 (2012),
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Louisiana are “exposing lowland areas to more frequent events of
saltwater intrusion, flooding, and rapid shoreline erosion,
magnifying the negative effects of coastal storms and storm
surge.”77 These effects are especially acute in Louisiana because it
has some of the world’s highest rates of soil subsidence, given the
historically dynamic nature of the Mississippi Delta that makes up
the eastern two-thirds of the state’s coastline.78 Furthermore, not
only is sea-level rise accelerating globally across the board, but in
Louisiana some areas are experiencing rates up to 58% greater than
other areas, demonstrating the regional variability with which sea
level can rise.79 The CPRA technical report recommended the
assumption of a Gulf sea-level rise of one meter by 2100, or, the
high end of the projections noted at the beginning of this section.
Ultimately, while populations rapidly rise and coastal wetlands
and other ecosystem services are rapidly lost to human
development, sea levels will slowly continue to rise. Yet, despite
sea-level rise’s methodical nature—and indeed perhaps because of
it—it will have potentially the most profound interjurisdictional
and nationwide impacts. These impacts will synergize with other
disasters like hurricanes and flood events to wreak havoc on the
human-built coastal environment and the ever-increasing
populations that live in coastal areas—especially in the absence of
innovative and responsible coastal land loss mitigation and
adaptation responses.
III. CAUGHT IN A DOUBLE BIND: THE MITIGATION–ADAPTATION
DILEMMA
[W]e understand that trying to maintain the status quo is not only
futile, it is a recipe for disaster.80

available at http://www.lacpra.org/assets/docs/LACES/20120124_Executive_
Summary_for_SLR_PaperNEW.pdf.
77. Id.
78. Mark Schleifstein, Louisiana Officials Establish Formula for Anticipating
Sea-Level Rise, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Feb. 7, 2012, 9:30 PM), http://www.nola.
com/environment/index.ssf/2012/02/louisiana_officials_establish.html?utm_source=
feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%253A+StatelineorgRssEnvironment+%2528Stateline.org+RSS+-+Environment%2529.
79. DEMARCO ET AL., supra note 76, at 4.
80. COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. OF LA., LOUISIANA’S
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST 24 (2012)
[hereinafter 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN], available at http://www.
lacpra.org/assets/docs/2012%20Master%20Plan/Final%20Plan/2012%20Coastal
%20Master%20Plan.pdf.
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Given that population growth, vanishing wetlands, and sealevel rise are causing coastal land loss at an alarming rate,
mitigation or adaptation measures will be an inevitable reality in
coastal zones of the future—whether through proactive policymaking or by force of nature if society is ultimately driven from
encroaching seas. Indeed, coastal governments are realizing that
“[r]educing the risk of disasters related to climate change in coastal
settlements will require a combination of mitigation, migration[,]
and settlement modification,”81 the latter two approaches of which
might be characterized simply as “adaptation.”
Before proceeding with a discussion of these two measures, a
point of clarification should be made. This Article uses the terms
mitigation and adaptation in a slightly different manner than they
are used in the climate change context generally. Coastal land loss
mitigation, as used herein, includes actions that seek to forestall or
mitigate land loss through wetland restoration, river diversion to
renourish coastlands and restore the natural accretion of land,
barrier island restoration, dam and levee building, and so on. Each
of these actions is typically considered “adaptation” in the climate
change context generally, with scholars and policy-makers
accepting that climate-change impacts will occur and pursuing
mechanisms for adapting to those changes. In addition, this use of
mitigation is divergent from general understandings of climate
change mitigation, where scholars and policy-makers focus on
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric concentrations
to halt or reverse anthropogenic global warming. Coastal land loss
adaptation, as used in this Article, means accepting that certain
coastal lands will be lost to subsidence or rising sea levels,
pursuing adaptation policies by moving out of areas likely to be
lost, and otherwise adjusting land-use planning to avoid new
development in those areas projected to be inundated. Adjustment
in the use of these terms, and divergence from how they are used in
the climate change context more generally, allows for more precise
focus on the coastal land loss phenomenon and its solutions. Both
coastal land loss mitigation and adaptation are briefly described in
this section.
A. Mitigation: Facing Charybdis, a Louisiana Case Study
Addressing land-use activities associated with the broader issue
of climate change mitigation might include policies aimed at, for
example, fostering urban design that builds settlements more
compactly in order to reduce carbon emissions from transportation
81. McGranahan et al., supra note 6, at 17.
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and other local activities.82 Mitigation of coastal land loss
specifically, on the other hand, would entail a variety of projects
aimed at building coastal land and keeping the sea at bay. A recent
example of coastal land loss mitigation policy is the State of
Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast
(Master Plan). The Master Plan is aimed at investing $50 billion
over upcoming decades to restore the Louisiana coast and at
mitigating coastal land loss by fighting the encroaching sea—
metaphorically taking on Charybdis with full force. After
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita pummeled the Louisiana coast, the
Louisiana Legislature created the Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority of Louisiana (CPRA), referenced above,
which was “required [to] develop a plan for a safe and sustainable
coast.”83 The Master Plan resulted from CPRA’s efforts and is
intended to establish a strategy for protecting a state whose
importance to the U.S.’s natural resources and economy cannot be
overstated.
In 2006, Louisiana alone accounted for 27% of the country’s
crude oil, 15% of its natural gas, 30% of commercial fisheries, and
21% of waterborne commerce, with coastal Louisiana maintaining
the country’s largest port complex.84 This coastal ecosystem
protects 90% of the country’s outer continental shelf oil and gas
and 26% of the commercial fisheries landings in the United
States.85 Yet, since the 1930s, Louisiana has lost over 1.2 million
acres of coastal land, and over the next 50 years Louisiana may
lose another 1.1 million acres, threatening not only the two million
people who live in south Louisiana and a variety of resources
crucial to Louisiana’s well-being, but also the well-being of the
country.86 For example, the Hackberry salt domes house one of just
four Strategic Petroleum Reserves in the country, potentially
holding 228 million barrels of crude oil, while Louisiana Highway
1 connects the nation to Port Fourchon, which supplies 18% of the
country’s oil. The loss of the highway could potentially cost the
country over $7 billion.87 Each of these areas is increasingly
threatened by “[c]oastal land loss [that] has placed these economic
82. Elisabeth M. Hamin & Nicole Gurran, Urban Form and Climate
Change: Balancing Adaptation and Mitigation in the U.S. and Australia, 33
HABITAT INT’L 238, 240 (2009), available at http://archone.tamu.edu/epsru/
Course_Readings/Ldev671MARS689/LDEV671_Readings/Hamin_urbanform_
habinternational.pdf.
83. 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 24.
84. CLEAR, supra note 40, at 1.
85. 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 20.
86. DRAFT MASTER PLAN, supra note 45, at 14.
87. 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 19.
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and natural resources at increased risk of loss due to the intense
effects of waves and storm surges from hurricanes.”88 Expected
annual flood damages over the next 50 years could increase by a
magnitude of ten, averaging up to a coast-wide average of as much
as $23 billion per year.89 Even commercial fishing has been
negatively impacted by coastal land loss. Though likely due to a
confluence of factors, it is worth noting that the total number of
Louisiana commercial fishing licenses has declined proportionally
with the loss of coastal land over the last 25 years, dropping from
nearly 30,000 in 1987 to a little over 10,000 in 2010.90 This
corresponds with the loss of nearly half a million acres of coastal
land over the same time period.91
The Master Plan aims to halt coastal land loss, to protect these
resources, and to restore coastal lands by utilizing complex
modeling that accounts for a variety of coastal land loss factors and
risks, including sea-level rise, subsidence, storm intensity and
frequency, river discharge and sediment load, marsh collapse, and
potential levee and floodwall failure.92 Most mitigation measures
within the Plan are matters of human engineering aimed at either
creating manmade structures to manage land loss or restoring
natural processes to do so. These include projects aimed at
protective levee building, bank stabilization, barrier island
restoration, channel realignment, hydrologic restoration, marsh
creation, bioengineered oyster barrier reef creation, ridge
restoration, shoreline protection projects, and sediment diversion93
(using up to 50% of the Mississippi River’s peak flow).94 These
measures will involve the construction of numerous types of
structures, such as earthen levees, concrete walls, and floodgates,
as well as increased pump use,95 and would, for instance, allow
gates to divert sediment and freshwater through currently
impenetrable levees to feed and replenish marshy terrain,
theoretically mimicking the natural flood events of the river before
the levees were put into place. The 25 land-building restoration
88. CLEAR, supra note 40, at 1.
89. 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 16.
90. DRAFT MASTER PLAN, supra note 45, at 89. Of course, a variety of other
factors can contribute to a drop in commercial fishing licenses, such as declining
fisheries or vessel buyback and other programs that take fishers out of the
market. Nonetheless, there is a dramatic correlation between coastal land loss in
Louisiana in particular and a drop in commercial licenses.
91. Id.
92. 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 83–92.
93. Id. at 66.
94. Id. at 33.
95. Id. at 70.
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projects that the plan projects to be most successful are comprised
of three primary types: channel realignment, marsh creation, and
sediment diversion projects.96 Nonstructural projects, on the other
hand, involve flood-proofing residential and commercial
properties, increasing the elevation of residential properties, and
voluntary acquisition of residential properties97—leaving
ambitious structural engineering projects as the plan’s primary
focus. Interestingly, the draft Master Plan asserted that only 3% of
the nonstructural projects suggested would involve voluntary
acquisition,98 but the final Master Plan is noncommittal regarding
the role of voluntary acquisitions.99
The financial expenditures projected to implement the plan are
equally ambitious, including an approximately $24 billion
investment in sediment diversion and marsh creation, $10 billion
for structural protections, $10 billion for nonstructural protections,
$2 billion for barrier island creation, $1 billion for hydrologic
restoration, and $3 billion for miscellaneous restoration projects,
bringing the total budget to around $50 billion.100 The plan justifies
these expenditures by finding, for instance, that an investment of
$25 billion in increased flood protection could prevent $100 billion
to $220 billion in direct asset damage to individuals, communities,
and industry over the next 50 years.101 The Master Plan actually
projects that if the state takes the recommended actions, then by
2042 Louisiana will begin to gain land annually for the first time
since the 1930s.102
Ultimately, mitigation measures like those outlined in the
Louisiana Master Plan may have the potential to undo some of the
past human contributions to coastal land loss while also harnessing
human ingenuity to both forestall further land losses and actually
build land over time. Yet, these measures do not come without
associated risk and uncertainty, in the form of complex and
speculative scientific, economic, and, as discussed below, legal and
political projections. Coastal land loss adaptation, on the other
96. Id. at 106.
97. Id. at 72.
98. DRAFT MASTER PLAN, supra note 45, at 65.
99. 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 72.
100. Id. at 34. The Master Plan looks to a variety of potential funding
sources, including the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, the Energy and
Water Act (Corps funding), the Coastal Wetlands Planning Protection and
Restoration Act, the Deepwater Horizon Natural Resources Damage
Assessment, the Deepwater Horizon Clean Water Act Penalties, Carbon and
Nutrient Credits, Future State Funding, and Louisiana’s Coastal Protection and
Restoration Fund. Id. at 93.
101. Id. at 140–41.
102. Id. at 29.
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hand, while being more certain in approach and outcome (i.e., if
people move away from the coast, they will most certainly avoid
inevitable land losses), carries with it its own difficulties—
primarily, that of forging the political will and societal fortitude to
make the harder choice over shorter time frames to adapt by
retreating from harm’s way.
B. Adaptation: Running on Scylla
As noted earlier, adaptation to climate change in the general
sense “seeks to adjust the built and social environment to minimize
the negative outcomes of now-unavoidable climate change”103 and
might very well include some of the coastal land loss mitigation
measures described above. Coastal land loss adaptation, on the
other hand, involves shifts in population patterns that give rise to
fundamental changes in existing and future infrastructure, the
protection of riverine and coastal floodplains and wetlands from
development, and increased preservation of ecosystems to act as
species corridors and other natural capital reservoirs as coastal
ecosystems are lost to sea-level rise104—it means running on
Scylla, the rocky shoal, farther inland. So in the face of “natural”
coastal land loss via sea-level rise, land loss adaptation means
reigning in “artificial” land loss to human development even
further, in order to remove the populace from lands likely to be lost
and provide more natural land to act as a buffer between rising seas
and human habitation that has moved farther inland. These
adaptation measures “require significant land to undertake, often
through the provision of open space used for . . . stormwater
management, sea level rise planning, or for migration corridors”105
and may require “a dramatic reduction in available areas for new
development and redevelopment” within existing communities.106
These types of actions would occur by the establishment of “policy
framework[s] for re-situating land uses that may become unsafe or
unsuitable in the future due to climate change,” by “[i]dentify[ing]
and reserv[ing] locations for relocation of major infrastructure,”107
and by “[a]ctively plan[ning] ahead for settlement reorientation or
design.”108

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Hamin & Gurran, supra note 82, at 238.
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 244.
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Obviously, there are “difficulties inherent in shifting the
direction of population movements and adapting to increasing
risk,” and “[m]igration away from lowest elevation coastal zones
will be important, but can also be costly and difﬁcult to implement
without causing severe disruptions. Modiﬁcation of the prevailing
forms of coastal settlement, so as to protect local residents, will
also be needed.”109 Indeed, scholars note that “[t]he risks to human
settlements could be reduced if people and enterprises could be
encouraged to move away from the coast, or at least from the most
risk-prone coastal locations.”110 Even so, “current population
movements are in the opposite direction[,] [and] [g]iven the
character of urban development, and that the factors driving
coastward movement are still poorly understood, turning these
ﬂows around is likely to be slow, costly or both.”111 Nonetheless,
preventative action regarding the placement of new settlements in
areas either likely to be lost or that will be needed in the future as a
buffer for settlement farther inland is a much cheaper and more
practical approach to adapting to coastal land loss.112 In other
words, though shifting current development and infrastructure will
undoubtedly be difficult, an approach that can be more easily
controlled is deterring the populace’s continued flock to the coast
and continued development of previously undeveloped lands on
the coast.
As scholars have noted, because so much coastal land has
already been developed, “most of the easier options for shifting
settlement patterns, and modifying them so that they are better
adapted to the risks of climate change, will have been foreclosed.”113
As a result, any option that remains is difficult to choose. Scholars
have argued that “[p]redicted weather-related events like sea level
rise, increased storm events, and extreme heat waves imply an
urgent need for new approaches to settlement design to enable
human and non-human species to adapt to these increased risks.”114
Unfortunately, not enough attention has been paid to mechanisms
for adapting settlement to the land-use related impacts of climate
change, with most focus being on mitigating impacts. This is almost
certainly because modern society has yet to face an environmental
problem on a scale that it has been unable to address or combat with
the right legal and policy tools; or, rather, on a scale that has
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

McGranahan et al., supra note 6, at 17.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 35.
Hamin & Gurran, supra note 82, at 238.
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foreclosed the ability to “mitigate” in some way. Indeed, “[i]n some
cases mitigation and adaptation are complementary[,] but in other
cases these policy goals may conflict.”115 Such is often the case
when choosing between: (1) not developing coastal land at all or
moving society out of those areas, and (2) building human-made
structures or attempting to restore natural processes through human
engineering.
In the end, adaptation provides a recipe arguably more simple
than mitigation for addressing coastal land loss, though one that is
just as difficult (and in the short term, likely more difficult) than
mitigation to implement—creating policies aimed at steering new
and existing development away from areas likely to be lost, and then
as areas become lost or increasingly under threat of loss, retreating
to higher ground. This has the potential, over the long term, to be far
less risky and less costly than investing billions in mitigating land
loss in areas likely to become inundated regardless of mitigation
efforts. And indeed, mitigation policy-makers acknowledge that a
balance of mitigation and adaptation approaches is necessary.
Louisiana’s Master Plan, for example, implicitly contemplates,
through the omission of protection measures for various areas of the
Louisiana coast, that some areas simply cannot be saved, and
retreating from those areas while investing in mitigation efforts
elsewhere would be wiser. The risk lies in striking the appropriate
balance between mitigation and adaptation. The next Part discusses
three reasons why, like Odysseus, policy-makers should consider
avoiding Charybdis and running on Scylla under circumstances
where the short-term lure of mitigation may be appealing but over
the longer view would be likely to fail—thus tipping the balance in
favor of adaptation in those areas.
IV. CHOOSING TO RUN ON SCYLLA: ADAPTING TO THE RISING TIDE
AND APPROACHING MITIGATION WITH CAUTION
Change is upon us. We can either embrace it or become victims of
the challenges we face.116
A. Uncertainty of Mitigation’s EffectivenessScientifically and
Institutionally
There are two primary forms of uncertainty regarding coastal
land loss mitigation, each of which should cause us to approach
mitigation with caution. The first is scientific uncertainty regarding
115. Id.
116. 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 38.
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the efficacy of wetland restoration, sediment diversion, and other
human engineering efforts to restore “natural” processes, as well as
modeling projections of sea-level rise and coastal land subsidence.
The Louisiana Master Plan, for example, highlights the need to
maintain realistic and “clear expectations” for mitigation efforts,
stating that “we cannot recreate the coast of the 20th Century.
Instead, we must seek to fashion a new landscape that will support
viable natural and human communities into the future.”117 Along
with those expectations comes recognition of the profound
uncertainties of projecting the viability of mitigation projects:
Although our protection and restoration efforts must be
based on sound and robust science, we must also
acknowledge that substantial uncertainties remain . . . . For
example, we do not know with certainty the rate of sea
level rise we can expect over the life of a restoration
project, nor can we fully predict all ecological responses to
actions such as sediment diversions.118
Take wetland restoration, for instance. In North America alone
within the last 20 years, more than $70 billion has been spent
restoring over seven million acres of wetlands.119 Though wetlands
restoration has become a “booming business,”120 some scientists
have argued that restoring wetlands often “fall[s] short of returning
wetlands to their former biological complexity and functioning.”121
These scientists have found that “current restoration practice fails
to recover original levels of wetland ecosystem functions, even
after many decades. If restoration as currently practiced is used to
justify further degradation, global loss of wetland ecosystem
function and structure will spread.”122 More directly, scientists
assert that “current restoration practice and wetland mitigation
policies will maintain and likely accelerate the global loss of
wetland ecosystem functions,”123 and that
117. Id. at 44.
118. Id. at 45.
119. Moreno-Mateos et al., supra note 35, at 1.
120. Rachel Nuwer, Not All Wetlands Are Created Equal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
24, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/not-all-wet
lands-are-created-equal/.
121. Id. See also Moreno-Mateos et al., supra note 35.
122. Moreno-Mateos et al., supra note 35, at 1.
123. Id. at 2. In other words, “ecosystem services may not be fully recovered
even when wetlands appear to be biologically restored. If markets for ecosystem
services and mitigation offsets from restored or created wetlands are used to
justify further wetland degradation, net loss of global wetland services will
continue and likely accelerate.” Id. at 6 (citation omitted). Carbon storage
capacity in particular is significantly degraded in restored wetlands. Id. at 3.
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[i]f we keep degrading or destroying wetlands, for example
through the use of mitigation banks, it is going to take
centuries to recover the carbon we are losing. . . . [P]reserve
the wetland, don’t degrade the wetland. . . . [C]urrent
thinking holds that many ecosystems just reach an
alternative state that is different, and you never will recover
the original.124
Much of the uncertainty around wetland restoration involves
further uncertainties surrounding the primary synergistic
relationship that is crucial to restoring wetlands in a delta system
like that of the Mississippi—namely, the synergy between
sediment diversion, subsidence, and sea-level rise. As noted
earlier, levees and dams along the Mississippi River have caused
sediment that once renourished and built land over time to be
channeled and conveyed beyond the outer continental shelf where
it cannot build land. This has led to subsidence, which combines
with sea-level rise to amplify coastal land loss. The first layer of
uncertainty regards rates of subsidence. As CPRA observed:
“Subsidence is a significant driver of relative sea-level rise in . . .
Louisiana . . . . While rates of subsidence are highly variable across
the Louisiana coastal zone, our understanding of the exact rates of
subsidence at the local level is very limited.”125 In addition, a
second layer of uncertainty regards sea-level rise—Louisiana
officials have noted that “there has been very little work done to
predict the specific change in the Gulf of Mexico water surface for
the rest of this century” and that without such study, “anticipated
sea-level changes in the Gulf of Mexico must be primarily
extrapolated from satellite altimetry or tide gauges, which can be
less reliable due to the limited period of record.”126 As a result, any
sediment diversion and wetland restoration projects aimed at
combating subsidence and sea-level rise is fraught with
compounded uncertainties. Indeed, opponents to coastal wetland
restoration, like that outlined in the Louisiana Master Plan, claim
that experimental sediment diversions that have been in place for at
least a decade have failed to rebuild land and combat subsidence,

124. Jeremy Hance, Protecting Original Wetlands Far Preferable to
Restoration, MONGABAY.COM (Jan. 26, 2012), http://news.mongabay.com/
2012/0126-hance_wetlands_restoration.html?utm_campaign=General+news&utm_
medium=Twitter&utm_source=SNS.analytics (citation omitted).
125. DEMARCO ET AL., supra note 76, at 6 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 4–5.
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and while scientists have shown improvements in those areas, land
has not rebuilt at rates initially predicted.127
Importantly, though “restoring wetlands remains a
controversial strategy,”128 the largest portion of money designated
by the Louisiana Master Plan—nearly $20 billion—is authorized
for coastal wetland restoration.129 Policy-makers should seriously
consider foregoing costly, short-term (geologically speaking)
restoration expenditures under circumstances in which the return
on investment is highly uncertain. Obviously, some projects may
be more efficacious than others, but it remains that while
mitigation via restoration may be appealing to the collective
societal psychology of believing that we can engineer our way out
of any environmental challenge, it may not be as realistic or
effective over the long term as adapting land-use patterns to retreat
from rising seas. In other words, we should avoid saddling the
taxpayer of today with costs of mitigation projects that are likely to
fail and therefore saddle future generations with continued
disappearance of coastal lands.
The second form of coastal land loss mitigation uncertainty is
institutional and includes both political and legal considerations.
One of the difficulties in designing policies aimed at both coastal
land loss mitigation and adaptation is achieving the appropriate
level of input at each level of government. While politics can
complicate policy design on one hand, principles of constitutional
law further compound the issue on the other. The federal
government currently maintains no regulatory inputs into a variety
of land-use activities that have critical implications for coastal land
lossprimarily regarding direct land-use planning that determines
both the intensity and extent of coastal development.130 This

127. Mark Fischetti, New Orleans Protection Plan Will Rely on Wetlands to
Hold Back Hurricanes, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Jan. 26, 2012), http://blogs.
scientificamerican.com/observations/2012/01/26/new-orleans-protection-plan-willrely-on-wetlands-to-hold-back-hurricanes/.
128. Id.
129. 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 34.
130. The federal government does maintain the ability to forestall coastal
wetland filling through its 404 permitting program under the Clean Water Act. 33
U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). Even so, and though the Corps receives an average of over
80,000 permit requests annually,
only about [9%] are required to go through a “detailed evaluation for an
individual permit;” most are approved through a nationwide or regionspecific permit. Of the [9%] that have to file for an individual permit,
less than 0.3[%] are denied. In Louisiana between 1988 and 1996,
[99%] of all permit applications were granted, including [92%] in flood
disaster areas.
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situation is largely due to the institutional inertia of jurisprudence
declaring that land-use regulation is the “quintessential state and
local power” under the Constitution.131 Even though state and local
governments maintain this quintessential role, they are doing little
to curb coastal land loss and the destruction of coastal ecosystem
services from human development activities, and indeed their
interests in promoting economic growth in their respective
jurisdictions run counter to preserving coastal lands or forestalling
coastal development today to combat coastal land loss in the
future. Consider a contrast between Louisiana and North Carolina.
While Louisiana has developed a plan to prepare for sea-level rise,
and has projected a one-meter rise in sea levels by the end of the
century, the North Carolina State Legislature has passed a
statute132 that caps sea-level rise projections at eight inches,
forbidding sea-level rise modeling that accounts for climate change
and instead basing the projection on only linear data from the
past—an outright rejection of their own state-appointed board of
scientists who projected a one-meter rise.133 This has led some

Brandee Ketchum, Note, Like the Swamp Thing: Something Ambiguous Rises
From the Hidden Depths of Murky Waters—The Supreme Court’s Treatment of
Murky Wet Land in Rapanos v. United States, 68 LA. L. REV. 983, 1011–12
(2008) (footnotes omitted). Additionally, the EPA only exercised its power to
veto Corps wetland permit issuance eleven times between 1972 and 2007.
CRAIG PITTMAN & MATTHEW WAITE, PAVING PARADISE: FLORIDA’S VANISHING
WETLANDS AND THE FAILURE OF NO NET LOSS 167 (2009).
131. State governments regulate land use under their authority to exercise the
“police power” for protection of the “general welfare.” See generally Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Scholars have recognized that “[t]he weight of
legal and political opinion holds that this allocation of power in [the U.S.] leaves
the states in charge of regulating how private land is used,” JOHN R. NOLON,
PATRICIA E. SALKIN & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008), and that “[l]and use law has always been a
creature of state and local law,” Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public
Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003). The U.S. Supreme Court has further
recognized that “[r]egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local
power.” Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006). See also Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Miss., 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982)
(“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.” (emphasis
added)). It is true that the Coastal Zone Management Act allows some level of
federal influence on coasts. It remains, however, a very weak approach and is a
voluntary program (to avoid federalism concerns) without significant
prescriptive dictates. See Hudson, supra note 75, at 2034, 2052–54.
132. Act of July 3, 2012, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 202.
133. Wade Rawlins, North Carolina Lawmakers Reject Sea Level Rise
Predictions, REUTERS (July 12, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
07/03/us-usa-northcarolina-idUSBRE86217I20120703. See also Scott Huler, NC
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commentators to declare that North Carolina has considered
“making sea level rise illegal.”134 Furthermore, it is not only states
that politically and legally make a successful, coordinated land loss
response uncertain. The federal government is complicit in
facilitating human settlement patterns within the coastal zone, as
its National Flood Insurance Program subsidizes poor development
in areas at risk for coastal land loss.135
Absent coordination, either among state and local governments
or provided by a higher-level authority, such as the federal
government, governments around the country may very well
continue to ignore the artificial and natural threats to coastal lands,
especially because they have incentives to grow their individual
economies, to increase the tax base by attracting more residents,
and to create job opportunities in order to maintain and continue to
grow the population and the economy. At the very least, even if
governments formulate plans, they may tip the scale toward
mitigation over adaptation when long-term prudence would call for
the opposite result. Ultimately, the collective inaction or
miscalculations of the federal government and the disparate and
numerous subnational governments damages the shared coastal
land resource.136
While horizontal coordination uncertainties exist regarding
political and legal actions across different levels of government,
such as the various states, there are also uncertainties regarding the
vertical coordination between the state and federal governments, as
well as between state governments, local governments, and private
property owners. For example, the initial draft of the Louisiana
Master Plan absolved the State of responsibility for potentially
important aspects of coastal restoration, stating, for example, that
“it is the state’s policy that funding for federally authorized
navigation channels is the sole responsibility of the federal
government”137 and that “[f]unding for those projects should come
at full federal expense.”138 By the final draft, the language had
been changed to: “For purposes of this plan, we assumed that
funding of these projects would be the responsibility of the federal
Considers Making Sea Level Rise Illegal, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (May 30, 2012),
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/2012/05/30/nc-makes-sea-levelrise-illegal/.
134. Huler, supra note 133.
135. See Hudson, supra note 75, at 2004.
136. See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested
Commons Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
137. DRAFT MASTER PLAN, supra note 45, at 62.
138. Id. at 141.
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government.”139 The State does assert that it will “work to secure
federal funding for projects shown to be important to the overall
coastal strategy,”140 but uncertainty is inherent regarding whether
the federal government will in fact be willing or able to do so.
Similarly, the state and federal governments are wrangling over
policy constraints relevant to wetland restoration. The Master
Plan’s success depends heavily upon the successful use of
sediment to restore and rebuild coastal wetlands, especially
because it has allocated $24 billion for the task. Though dredged
sediment is normally dumped in upland disposal sites or in the
Gulf, since 2009 the State of Louisiana has required private parties
who plan to dredge more than 25,000 cubic yards of sediment to
place the dredged material in a coastal restoration project or pay a
fee.141 Yet, federalism rears its ugly head once again and places
large quantities of sediment beyond the project’s reach. In order to
maintain navigation channels, the Corps of Engineers dredges
sediment along the coast in greater amounts than any other entity
in Louisiana (58 million cubic yards per year), and very little of
this is diverted to wetlands.142 The Corps claims, according to the
Master Plan, that its authorizations and budget do not allow the
beneficial use of this dredged material for restoration projects.143
Thus, this is a complication that will need to be addressed, though
exactly how it will be resolved is unclear since the State absolves
itself of any funding related to navigation channel maintenance
handled by the federal government.
Not only do entities up the chain, such as the federal
government, foster uncertain political and legal outcomes, but so
too do entities “down the chain,” such as local governments and
private property owners. The nonstructural solutions to coastal
land loss in Louisiana, as described in the Master Plan, are
dependent upon amending the regulatory requirements of local
land-use planning, building codes, flood damage prevention
ordinances, and risk reduction project funding.144 The Master Plan
describes the problem of “induced risk,” whereby structural
solutions to protect from hurricane and flood damage “encourage
unwise development in high risk areas.”145 Induced risk has been
the norm in the past along the Louisiana coast, even though it
“increases overall levels of risk and diminishes the effectiveness of
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 69.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 159.
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the protection structures themselves.”146 As a result, the Master
Plan asserts that “wetland areas inside the hurricane protection
system need to remain intact and undeveloped. Land use
ordinances that contain nonstructural risk reduction measures . . .
can ensure that our coastal investments bring maximum benefits
while providing for economic growth.”147 This aspirational
language establishes no mechanism for guaranteeing that these
steps will actually be taken, at the state or subnational government
levels, adding yet another layer of uncertainty as to whether all
levels of government will take the necessary political and legal
actions to successfully implement mitigation goals.
In addition to political and legal uncertainty, the Master Plan
acknowledges that 80% of the coast is privately owned and that
“[t]he rights of these landowners, including mineral rights, must be
acknowledged” as coastal projects are designed.148 As a result,
“landowners should be partners with the state as projects are
planned, designed, constructed, and operated.”149 While this sounds
good in theory, in practice, relying on the cooperation of so many
private property owners turns what would otherwise be an
uncertainty into a certainty—states are certain to have difficulties
procuring the necessary cooperation of private property owners to
the degree that may be needed to have successful mitigation
policies.
Ultimately, in the mitigation context, uncertainty exists
regarding the scientific projections that the mitigation policy relies
upon, particularly in the areas of wetland restoration, sediment
diversion, subsidence, and sea-level rise. Uncertainty also exists
regarding the coordination and implementation of needed legal and
political actions by the federal government, state and local
governments, and private property owners. These compounded
uncertainties should caution against relying too heavily on
mitigation efforts in areas where, over the long-term view,
adaptation would provide far more certainty. In these areas, policymakers should design policies that move society away from coastal
lands likely to be lost, so the impacts of future coastal land loss on
society will be reduced. To be clear, this is not to argue that coastal
mitigation projects are uniformly poor policies, or even that certain
short-term benefits gained by coastal restoration are not worthwhile
investments. A wide variety of coastal restoration projects, including
those that “protect vital coastal and marine habitat, restore species
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 167.
Id.
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that keep coastal systems healthy, remove invasive species, create
shellfish spawning sanctuaries and re-establish water flows to
estuaries,”150 may very well be successful. The same may be said for
certain sediment diversion and wetland restoration projects.
Similarly, tipping the scale too far in favor of coastal land loss
adaptation may cause society to lose valuable economic and
environmental benefits provided by the coast that may very well
have turned out to be “fixable” and sustainable over the long term.
Yet, as discussed in the next section, this Part is primarily concerned
with the scale being tipped too far toward mitigation because it is
the most politically expedient choice—a situation that distorts
assessment of which approach is actually more appropriate.
B. The Political Expediency of Choosing Mitigation over Adaptation
The second reason to proceed with caution regarding coastal
land loss mitigation policies is the tempting political expediency that
may drive policy choices to implement coastal land loss mitigation
over adaptation. A stark example of the political appeal for
mitigation policies is the Louisiana Master Plan poll determining
that 89% of Louisianans “believe that [Louisiana’s] coast is very
important” and that 85% of Louisianans “believe it is smart to invest
dollars in risk reduction and coastal restoration.”151 Importantly, the
Master Plan notes that “[p]eople were not willing to give up on the
coast, nor were they willing to write off areas at risk.”152 This
demonstrates the intuitive appeal to a legislator for proposing and
supporting mitigation policies aimed at restoring and saving the
coast, especially if the public sees adaptation policies as “writing
off” areas at risk.
Contrast these results with a recent study undertaken by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Sea
Grant institutions of Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, and
Alabama. When polled about climate change generally, only about
42% of coastal Louisianans said they were “very concerned,”153
while only 46% said that the effect of climate change on their local
150. Mark Tercek, Coastal Restoration: A Smart Investment, HUFFPOST
GREEN (Feb. 22, 2012, 1:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-tercek/
coastal-restoration_b_1292642.html.
151. 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 51.
152. Id.
153. KIRBY GOIDEL ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., TEX. SEA
GRANT, LA. SEA GRANT, FLA. SEA GRANT & MISS.–ALA. SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM,
2012 GULF COAST CLIMATE CHANGE SURVEY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11 (2012),
available at http://www.southernclimate.org/documents/resources/Climate_change_
perception_survey_summary_NOAA_Sea_Grant_2012.pdf.
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community would be “very or somewhat negative.”154 Around 35%
said climate change would be neither negative nor positive, and
approximately 18% actually said that the effects of climate change
would be positive.155 So, though regionally Louisianans want to
address the problems caused by climate change—accelerated coastal
land loss—many fail to make the connection between land loss and
climate change as one of the key drivers of the problem.
Furthermore, the number of Louisianans statewide who are very
concerned with climate change and who think its effects would be
negative may well be lower than 42% and 46% respectively because
those numbers only reflect coastal residents’ opinions—the NOAA
and Sea Grant report found that coastal residents are more likely to
believe climate change is happening than noncoastal residents.156
Finally, while 89% of Louisianans statewide support coastal land
loss mitigation policies, only around 66% of coastal residents
support incentives to relocate from threatened areas, only 69%
support limiting the types of structures built in high-risk areas, and
only 29% support raising insurance rates for high-risk areas157—
each of which are key aspects of land loss adaptation.
These numbers present a glimpse into how well-received might
be the legislator who says, “We need to dramatically rethink and
restructure how and where we undertake new development, and we
need to transition current infrastructure to lower risk areas.” Given
the long time scales, relative to human lifespans, that a policymaker’s decision takes to be proven “correct” or “incorrect,” one
might say it would always be in the legislator’s best interest to
propose mitigation over adaptation. The upside political and
governance benefits are large, as the populace gets what it wants
(though the populace may not be fully informed about what it
needs), and any political downside is small because the policymaker is not likely to be around to witness the negative
ramifications if mitigation policies ultimately fail in the future. Yet,
none of these governance and political considerations provides any
qualitative indication about whether either adaptation or mitigation
policies are indeed the best option for a given area, which is, of
course, what should drive decision-making, rather than political
expediency.
In addition to the effect that citizens’ opinions on threats to
their regional coastal interests can have on policy-makers’
choices—a phenomena that acts as a type of endowment effect for
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 16.
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residents in states with important coastal resources—two other
political considerations should cause policy-makers to approach
mitigation cautiously. The first is simply the inertia that a
mitigation policy gains once implemented. Once mitigation is
relied upon to fortify coasts through large-scale engineering
projects, with equally large-scale and corresponding economic
investments, a preference arises to maintain that solution in
perpetuity. Once billions of dollars are invested in levees, dams,
seawalls, realigned channels, and wetland restoration, subsequent
policy decisions are predisposed to protect those investments
through even more mitigation measures. This acts as yet another
distorting influence on the objective choice between adaptation and
mitigation, as it becomes even more difficult to change course
toward adaptation by letting those investments disappear.
The second additional political consideration involves the basic
political incentives that the U.S. economic system provides. The
desire to develop in floodplains to grow local and national
economies is one reason current mitigation measures, such as
levees, have been implemented in the first instance, giving rise to
political pressure to maintain those measures. For example,
recently Bay St. Louis, Mississippi officials attempted to remove
markers along the interstate demarking the high-water flood mark
reached during Hurricane Katrina.158 As noted earlier, the extent of
Katrina’s destruction was due in great part to the commercial
development of floodplains that destroyed natural wetland buffer
systems. This resulted in floodwaters in Bay St. Louis that actually
reached the overhead span where Interstate 10 crossed over
another highway.159 Even so, one Bay St. Louis councilmember
stated that “the markers are detrimental to attracting businesses
that might want to relocate [in the area], especially on undeveloped
property around the interstate . . . .”160 In fact, “[s]ome city leaders
envision the interstate property as a magnet that will pull in
restaurants, motels, and big-box retailers.”161 Though these
commercial establishments may very well be under water during
the next major hurricane, local government officials and economic
development interests are politically predisposed to forego a
needed adaptation policy for the sake of achieving the short-term
economic benefits that a mitigation policy may achieve.
158. Associated Press, Bay St. Louis Officials Oppose Hurricane Katrina
High-Water Markers on Highway, NOLA.COM (July 23, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://
www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2011/07/bay_st_louis_officials_oppose.html.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Ultimately, political expediency based upon regional
endowment, policy inertia, and economic development
considerations distort the coastal land loss mitigation versus
adaptation choice. As a result, policy makers should take those
distortions into account and objectively assess their policy choices
based on scientific and other tangible considerations, rather than
merely political expediency.
C. Failure to Adapt Past Land-Use Activities in the Coastal Zone
has Contributed to the Need to Adapt or Mitigate Today
The third and final reason why we should approach mitigation
policies cautiously is the fact that failure to adapt past land-use
activities in the coastal zone is one reason that mitigation and
adaptation policies are now needed, lending support to the argument
that adaptation now can avoid both costly mitigation policies, as
well as preempt the need to adapt or mitigate in the future.
Anecdotally, I recently purchased a home on Highland Road in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The road is named “Highland” because
historically it was the ridge where the natural floodplain of the
Mississippi ended. As a result, people adapted to the natural
circumstances by building their homes on the ridge—perhaps the
ultimate form of adaptive, self-insuring land-use planning, achieved
at low cost and with minimal effort (relative to building elsewhere,
at least). This approach to development, however, has long since
disappeared, as people now live in a world of levees and other
structural solutions that places residential and commercial
development within floodplains abutting structures that then must be
maintained in perpetuity. As a result, society must make the difficult
cost–benefit choice to flood one city because it would cause less
damage than flooding another city—which happened recently along
the Mississippi River.162 In other words, society is forced to mitigate
flood damages because it failed to adapt long ago, choosing instead
to develop in floodplains and to store a massive amount of energy
behind levees ever-increasing in bulk. While such measures may be
an option to bail out communities that undertake poor land-use
planning along a river, it simply will not be a choice for combatting
constant, irreversible, and relatively geographically uniform sealevel rise in the coastal zone.
Indeed, in the coastal zone we have exacerbated vanishing
wetlands and rising seas by refusing in the past to adapt to their
162. Major General Michael Walsh as told to Bruce Grierson, How I
Contained the Mississippi, DISCOVER MAG., Apr. 2012, at 18, available at
http://discovermagazine.com/2012/apr/14-how-i-contained-the-mississippi.
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existence and to structure society around them. Instead, we have
replaced natural capital with human-built capital, and then invested
untold economic resources into mitigating risks that we ourselves
created. The irony of a recent Article titled “New Orleans Protection
Plan Will Rely on Wetlands to Hold Back Hurricanes”163 is that, of
course, Katrina’s damages were exacerbated because of the prior
removal of wetlands through development activities. Though
“[d]ecades ago the delta had thick, robust marshes and swamps that
began behind the barrier islands and ran back for miles and miles to
where towns and cities had sprouted,”164 those sprouting cities
expanded and replaced these natural systems with development. The
Louisiana Master Plan itself specifically acknowledges the role that
manmade levees and floodgates have had in channeling the
Mississippi River into the Gulf and starving the coastal ecosystem of
fresh water and sediment, while oil and gas canal dredging has
weakened marshes and allowed salt water infiltrationall of this
compounded by sea-level rise, subsidence, and storms.165 The
Master Plan acknowledges that “[o]ur current coastal crisis is due in
large part to past decisions that have altered the natural processes of
the coast. Both protection and restoration projects can support or
impede these processes.”166
With regard to the Mississippi River, the Master Plan
acknowledges the inherent trade-off when human development and
natural systems collide, which is an unavoidable aspect of coastal
land loss mitigation policies:
Since the late 1930s, the Mississippi River has been
controlled by federally built levees. By reducing river flood
risks and providing reliable navigation, the levees have
allowed communities throughout the river’s watershed to
thrive. But the levees have also deprived Louisiana’s
wetlands of the sediment and fresh water that once built
and sustained them. One of the many severe effects of this
land loss disaster has been an increase in hurricane based
flooding risk to communities. We must allow more river
water and sediment to spread across the delta if we are to
provide a sustainable future for the ecosystem, navigation,
industry, and communities.167

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See Fischetti, supra note 127.
Id.
2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 80, at 18.
Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
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This statement might be paraphrased: “We have mitigated in
the past, and therefore must continue mitigating in the future to
protect past land-use patterns.” An adaptation approach, on the
other hand, uncouples significant anthropogenic impacts on natural
systems in the coastal zone and does not attempt to extend artificial
wetlands further—though reestablishment of wetlands that
development has replaced may present an adaptive approach.
Rather, adaptation prevents development from encroaching on
natural coastal barriers already intact. Had this approach been
taken in the past, adaptation or mitigation policies would be less
necessary today. While adaptation policies may presently create
significant economic and social difficulties, future residents of the
coastal zone may very well prefer that we adapt where necessary,
rather than continue a cycle of perpetually mitigating risks that we
ourselves create.
V. CONCLUSION
Coastal land loss is an inevitable environmental challenge that
society must face in a changing climate. Even so, society maintains
legal and policy tools to address it, in the form of coastal land loss
mitigation and adaptation. Many current environmental problems
are caused by a failure to engage in policy-making that foregoes
short-term interests for long-term societal well-being. So too may
be the case if society fails to strike the appropriate balance between
coastal land loss mitigation and adaptation policies. In many ways,
mitigation is an unknown quantity compared with adaptation. We
know that adaptation can and will be disruptive, and for the most
part, we can pinpoint just how disruptive in real time based upon
known data points. We also know exactly what measures will be
necessary to allow a retreat from harm’s way, and we can choose
just how far removed we want to be from high-risk coastal land
loss areas. Mitigation, on the other hand, is fraught with
uncertainty, and its viability and desirability is further distorted by
a variety of political and economic considerations. Finally, a
failure to err on the side of adaptation in the past has given rise to
many current coastal land loss problems.
Ultimately, a balance of adaptation and mitigation will
necessarily be part of our response to coastal land loss. As we
weigh those respective options, however, we should do so
honestly, with consideration to future generations, and with an
accounting of costs and benefits over long time scales—because in
some circumstances it may very well be better to run on Scylla to
avoid Charybdis.

